Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy - Revision history

Ruth Shaw at 10:36, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:36:14Z

Ruth Shaw at 10:32, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:32:50Z

Ruth Shaw: /* Other tax competition */

2026-08-05T10:31:40Z

‎Other tax competition

Ruth Shaw: /* Political background */

2026-08-05T10:30:37Z

‎Political background

Ruth Shaw at 10:29, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:29:59Z

Ruth Shaw at 10:27, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:27:31Z

Show changes

Ruth Shaw at 09:02, 31 July 2026

2026-07-31T09:02:24Z

Ruth Shaw at 08:36, 31 July 2026

2026-07-31T08:36:59Z

Ruth Shaw at 12:03, 15 May 2026

2026-05-15T12:03:03Z

Ruth Shaw at 08:12, 8 April 2026

2026-04-08T08:12:58Z

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 The UK has provided some form of Mobile-individual relief since 1914. Before 2025 the distinction between Mobile Individuals and Established Residents was determined by reference to domicile (supplemented by 7-year, 12-year and 15-year residence tests).  The Mobile-individual reliefs were the IT/CGT remittance basis and protected-trust reliefs (informally known as non-dom reliefs).
-After 2025, the distinctionbetween Mobile Individuals and Established Residents is determined by Qualifying New Resident status, in short, 10-year absence followed by no more than four years' residence, and the Mobile-individual relief is FIG relief.<ref> In this chapter I use the term “FIG relief” to include OWR.</ref>
+After 2025, the distinction between Mobile Individuals and Established Residents is determined by Qualifying New Resident status, in short, 10-year absence followed by no more than four years' residence, and the Mobile-individual relief is FIG relief.<ref> In this chapter I use the term “FIG relief” to include OWR.</ref>
 ==Tax competition==
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 :<i>https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w1679/w1679.pdf</i>
 Musgrave "Horizontal Equity Once More" National Tax Journal 43, no. 2 (1990) p.113-23
-:<i>	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/NTJ41788830?journalCode=ntj</i></ref> but their limitations are exposed when one tries to apply them in a real life context, such as an assessment of the fairness of the former remittance basis or FIG relief.  The concepts are not so much a definition of fairness as an approach to identifying the issues.  In deciding whether FIG relief is fair, one needs to ask if qualifying new residents and other UK residents relevantly equal.  The answer is not self-evident.
+:<i>	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/NTJ41788830?journalCode=ntj</i></ref> but their limitations are exposed when one tries to apply them in a real life context, such as an assessment of the fairness of the former remittance basis or FIG relief.  The concepts are not so much a definition of fairness as an approach to identifying the issues.  In deciding whether FIG relief is fair, one needs to ask if qualifying new residents and other UK residents are relevantly equal.  The answer is not self-evident.
 ==Assessment of reform: Metrics==
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 (2)	The “'''immigration response'''”: how many would choose not to come
-The Warwick Papers concluded, contrary to the generally- and long-accepted view, that the emigration and immigration responses would be small.  The Papers gives figures for the tax yield which would increase if the reliefs were abolished:
+The Warwick Papers concluded, contrary to the generally- and long-accepted view, that the emigration and immigration responses would be small.  The Papers give figures for the tax yield which would increase if the reliefs were abolished:
 :After accounting for this limited migration response, including the loss of existing tax paid by non-doms who leave, the additional tax that would be received is £3.23 billion. The net additional revenue to government, after also accounting for the loss of the remittance basis charge receipts, is £3.16 billion. Based on the upper bound for the expected migration effects, we can rule out increases in receipts of below £2.4 billion.
 :These findings allow us to rule out the concern – previously raised by Labour and Conservative politicians alike – that abolishing the non-dom regime would ‘cost Britain money’. ... Objections to restriction or removal of the remittance basis cannot therefore be based on their fiscal effects.
-I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE paper)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick papers:
+I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE paper)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick Papers:
 (1)	FIG relief: the Papers floated the possibility of a short term residence relief to replace the former remittance basis, but did not evaluate its cost<br/>
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 The cap on IHT payable by trusts, announced in the 2026 budget,<ref>See [[Excluded Property Exemptions#Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief | Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief]]</ref>  is a recognition that the 2025 reforms went too far, and of concern about the numbers of non-doms who have left the UK or are planning to leave.  Of course those who have already left the UK are not likely to return.
-What proportion of IHT strictly due will be properly paid on the death of non-resident LTRs, or on settlements made by non-resident LTRs?
+What proportion of IHT strictly due will be properly paid on the death of non-resident LTRs, or on settlements made by non-resident LTRs? Discuss.
-−
 Discuss.
 ===Economic benefit: FIG relief===
@@ Line 430: / Line 428: @@
 Demos claims to be Britain's leading cross-party think-tank.</ref>
-Reinforcing the tendency not to consult is an HMRC culture which is hostile to the tax profession.  Chris Tailby, head of the HMRC Tax Avoidance Group 2004-2009 records:
+Reinforcing the tendency not to consult is an HMRC culture which is hostile to the tax profession.  Chris Tailby, head of HMRC Tax Avoidance Group 2004-2009, records:
 :... I was never happier than when a new tax avoidance initiative was greeted with howls of protest from the tax avoidance quarter.<ref>Tailby, "Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance" [2011] PCB 41.</ref>

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 ''Users may [[contribute to the text]].  If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections.  A free subscription to the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits.  User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''
-For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf  Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]
+For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/5/5a/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%281%29.pdf  Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]
 ==Scope of chapter==

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 | colspan="2"  |  ''Income Tax''
 |-
-| Interest: Reliefs for non–residents  || [[Interest Income#Withholding tax: Exceptions | Withholding tax: Exceptions]]; [[Non-Resident Income Tax Relief#Non-residents IT relief: Introduction | Non-residents IT relief: Introduction]]
+|    Interest: Reliefs for non–residents  || [[Interest Income#Withholding tax: Exceptions | Withholding tax: Exceptions]]; [[Non-Resident Income Tax Relief#Non-residents IT relief: Introduction | Non-residents IT relief: Introduction]]
 |-
-| IME: Non-residents trading in investments || [[Investment Manager Exemptions#Investment manager exemptions | Investment manager exemptions]]
+|    IME: Non-residents trading in investments || [[Investment Manager Exemptions#Investment manager exemptions | Investment manager exemptions]]
 |-
 | colspan="2"  |  ''IHT''
 |-
-|UK funds: IHT relief for non LTRs || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled UK funds | Non-settled UK funds]]
+|    UK funds: IHT relief for non LTRs || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled UK funds | Non-settled UK funds]]
 |-
-| FOTRA securities: IHT relief for non-residents || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled FOTRA securities | Non-settled FOTRA securities]], [[Excluded Property: Definition#Income unpaid on life tenant death | Income unpaid on life tenant death]]
+|    FOTRA securities: IHT relief for non-residents || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled FOTRA securities | Non-settled FOTRA securities]], [[Excluded Property: Definition#Income unpaid on life tenant death | Income unpaid on life tenant death]]
 |}

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 This is not to say that the 2025 reforms are not defensible, on the basis of fairness or otherwise, just that little reasoned debate took place in public, and probably limited debate took place in private.
-===Clear and easy to operate
+===Clear and easy to operate===
 The 2025 rules are a success by these criteria.  They are unquestionably clearer than the pre-2025 rules. The test of residence is clearer than domicile.

@@ Line 134: / Line 134: @@
 Wales would also like to join in:
 :"If Northern Ireland is allowed to cut corporation tax, it would be outrageous if Welsh politicians did not have the option of doing the same"
+Gerald Holtham, chair of the Holtham Commission for Wales (Cited in the Scottish consultation paper).<br/>
-Gerald Holtham, chair of the Holtham Commission for Wales (Cited in the Scottish consultation paper).
-−
 So in the future there might be no shortage of corporation tax competition within the UK.</ref>
@@ Line 318: / Line 316: @@
 :These findings allow us to rule out the concern – previously raised by Labour and Conservative politicians alike – that abolishing the non-dom regime would ‘cost Britain money’. ... Objections to restriction or removal of the remittance basis cannot therefore be based on their fiscal effects.
-I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE papers)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick papers:
+I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE paper)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick papers:
 (1)	FIG relief: the Papers floated the possibility of a short term residence relief to replace the former remittance basis, but did not evaluate its cost<br/>

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:02, 31 July 2026
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−	''Users may [[contribute to the text]]. If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections. A ~~copy of~~ the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits. User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''	+	''Users may [[contribute to the text]]. If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections. A free subscription to the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits. User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''

	For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]		For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]

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-''Users may [[contribute to the text]].  If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections.  A copy of the next edition of the book will be given to the user who makes the most edits.  User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''
+''Users may [[contribute to the text]].  If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections.  A copy of the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits.  User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''
 For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf  Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]
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 In short, preventing avoidance has been a priority that outweighs other considerations, such as certainty, workability and the Rule of Law; or rather obliterates all consideration; and listening to the tax avoidance quarter – which includes the professional bodies and almost any practitioner who said what HMRC did not want to hear – has been ruled out.  The professional bodies are regarded by HMRC as a pressure group whose vaunted commitment to fairness, practicality and the Rule of Law is merely a cloak for self-interested whingeing of a featherbedded elite.<ref>This may be seen in the context of a more general antagonism to the legal (and other) professions, and dismissal of their ethical pretensions.  That is an ancient trope, but took renewed vigour under the Thatcher administration, and has lead to a transfer of regulatory power from the Bar and Law Society to regulation by non-lawyers.</ref>
-That policy has ruled since the 1997 Blair administration, and its consequences can be seen in seeking to state the law, as this book seeks to do, or in seeking to understand the law, as you the reader will do now.
+That policy has ruled since the 1997 Blair administration, and its consequences can be seen in seeking to state the law, as this work seeks to do, or in seeking to understand the law, as you the reader will do now.
 === Tax Consultation Framework===

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:03, 15 May 2026
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	This does not mention the Tax Consultation Framework, but it is not consistent with it, so it appears that the Framework has been abandoned.		This does not mention the Tax Consultation Framework, but it is not consistent with it, so it appears that the Framework has been abandoned.
		+
		+	In ''Martin, R (oao) v Chancellor of the Exchequer'' the applicant sought a declaration that the BPR reforms of the FA 2026 were enacted in breach of these principles (and so presumably void? but that was not pursued, perhaps wisely). I would have thought that was simply unarguable. But the Court listened respectfully (“excellent skeleton arguments”) before dismissing it:<ref> [2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin) at [64].</ref>
		+
		+	:these commitments are essentially political, made by politicians about the way those politicians intend to govern, and enforceable in the political arena... These statements are not enforceable as a matter of public law.

	===A hard prescription===		===A hard prescription===

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 So in the future there might be no shortage of corporation tax competition within the UK.</ref>
-Similar issues apply to taxation of individuals.<ref>See [[Rates of Income Tax/CGT#IT competition within UK | IT competition within UK]]</ref>  Competition in the field of new UK residents is therefore only one aspect of a wider topic.
+Similar issues apply to taxation of individuals.<ref>See [[Rates of Income Tax/CGT/CT#IT competition within UK | IT competition within UK]]</ref>  Competition in the field of new UK residents is therefore only one aspect of a wider topic.
 ===Attitudes to tax competition===