Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy - Revision history

Ruth Shaw at 14:04, 15 October 2026

2026-10-15T14:04:48Z

Ruth Shaw at 08:46, 25 September 2026

2026-09-25T08:46:38Z

Ruth Shaw at 11:12, 18 September 2026

2026-09-18T11:12:28Z

Ruth Shaw at 10:36, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:36:14Z

Ruth Shaw at 10:32, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:32:50Z

Ruth Shaw: /* Other tax competition */

2026-08-05T10:31:40Z

‎Other tax competition

Ruth Shaw: /* Political background */

2026-08-05T10:30:37Z

‎Political background

Ruth Shaw at 10:29, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:29:59Z

Ruth Shaw at 10:27, 5 August 2026

2026-08-05T10:27:31Z

Show changes

Ruth Shaw at 09:02, 31 July 2026

2026-07-31T09:02:24Z

@@ Line 323: / Line 323: @@
 Given the likely migration response, it does not seem likely to the author that the reforms will bring in any additional revenue.
-The cap on IHT payable by trusts, announced in the 2026 budget,<ref>See [[Excluded Property Exemptions#Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief | Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief]]</ref>  is a recognition that the 2025 reforms went too far, and of concern about the numbers of non-doms who have left the UK or are planning to leave.  Of course those who have already left the UK are not likely to return.
+The cap on IHT payable by trusts, announced in the 2026 budget,<ref>See [[IHT Charges & Excluded Property Exemptions#Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief | Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief]]</ref>  is a recognition that the 2025 reforms went too far, and of concern about the numbers of non-doms who have left the UK or are planning to leave.  Of course those who have already left the UK are not likely to return.
 What proportion of IHT strictly due will be properly paid on the death of non-resident LTRs, or on settlements made by non-resident LTRs? Discuss.

@@ Line 517: / Line 517: @@
 This document replaces the Tax Consultation Framework which was withdrawn on 1 October 2025 because it was "out of date".<ref> ''https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-consultation-framework''</ref>
-	It is hard to say if post 2025 reforms have followed the “Tax Policy Making Principles” because the document does not impose identifiable requirements.
+It is hard to say if post 2025 reforms followed the “Tax Policy Making Principles” because the document does not impose identifiable requirements. ; in any case the document is superceded by the announcement discussed below
 In ''Martin, R (oao) v Chancellor of the Exchequer'' the applicant sought a declaration that the BPR reforms of the FA 2026 were enacted in breach of these principles (and so presumably void? but that was not pursued, perhaps wisely).  I would have thought that was simply unarguable.  But the Court listened respectfully (“excellent skeleton arguments”) before dismissing it:<ref> [2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin) at [64].</ref>
 :these commitments are essentially political, made by politicians about the way those politicians intend to govern, and enforceable in the political arena... These statements are not enforceable as a matter of public law.
 ===A hard prescription===

@@ Line 492: / Line 492: @@
 :'''2. Predictability and stability'''
 :The government’s approach to tax policy making is underpinned by a commitment to a single major fiscal event each year, whereby tax policy measures announced at the annual Budget are legislated for in an annual Finance Bill or appropriate legislative vehicle.
-:Where possible, the government will look to provide further predictability and stability to taxpayers by indicating a clear direction of travel for the tax system. An example of this is the Corporate Tax Roadmap that was published at Autumn Budget 2024. The government has already started to deliver on the commitments set out in the roadmap, including consulting on aspects of the Corporation Tax regime, such as the Reform of UK law in relation to transfer pricing, permanent establishment and Diverted Profits Tax which was launched on 28 April 2025. This approach has given businesses more of the certainty that they need to make long-term decisions, and the confidence that the UK intends to maintain its competitive position among major economies.
+:Where possible, the government will look to provide further predictability and stability to taxpayers by indicating a clear direction of travel for the tax system. An example of this is the Corporate Tax Roadmap that was published at Autumn Budget 2024. ...
-Stability is not achieved by any of these matters.  Stability is achieved by not making changes.
+Stability is not achieved by any of these matters.  Stability is achieved by not making changes. But the Corporate Tax Roadmap has not been followed as a precedent elsewhere.
 :'''3.   A smart and agile approach to consultation'''
@@ Line 500: / Line 500: @@
 :A key principle that underpins the government’s approach to tax policy making is robust engagement with interested groups. Tax professionals have said that responding to multiple consultations that have been published at single points in the tax policy making cycle is resource intensive. Their preference is to spread the burden of responding more evenly throughout the year.
 In response to that feedback, the government will take a more agile approach to consultation by publishing any supporting documents flexibly following announcement.
-:The government will also take a more flexible approach to technical consultation on draft legislation. While draft legislation will typically continue to be published on Legislation day (L-day) in the summer, the government will, where appropriate, look to publish technical consultations at other points in the cycle sufficiently in advance of the introduction of the Finance Bill to ease the burden on stakeholders. This is a continuation of the approach taken by the government since the start of the Parliament in July 2024.
+:The government will also take a more flexible approach to technical consultation on draft legislation. While draft legislation will typically continue to be published on Legislation day (L-day) in the summer, the government will, where appropriate, look to publish technical consultations at other points in the cycle sufficiently in advance of the introduction of the Finance Bill to ease the burden on stakeholders ...
 :To provide stability and predictability to taxpayers, the government will clearly update on tax announcements at key points throughout the fiscal event cycle (e.g. at Budget).
@@ Line 506: / Line 506: @@
 :The government recognises the importance of engaging with taxpayers on the development of tax policy wherever possible.
 :The government must also be able to deliver change quickly. Hence it will work flexibly, considering where and when it is appropriate to engage on tax policy with external stakeholders, and will consider the best channels for doing so.
-:The government will prioritise dynamic and frequent engagement with tax professionals. The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury has already conducted and will continue to conduct extensive engagement on tax policy, meeting directly with stakeholders. During this Parliament, examples of such engagement include roundtables to inform the Corporate Tax Roadmap and the Tax update spring 2025: simplification, administration and reform package. As in these cases, the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury will ensure that stakeholders have an opportunity to provide feedback on tax policy making alongside discussions on specific tax policy issues.
+:The government will prioritise dynamic and frequent engagement with tax professionals. The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury has already conducted and will continue to conduct extensive engagement on tax policy, meeting directly with stakeholders. ...
 :Similarly, policy officials will continue to collaborate with stakeholders at all stages of tax policy development where appropriate. This engagement will be conducted flexibly, through a variety of channels.
 :In some cases, it will not be appropriate or practicable for the government to formally consult on tax changes – these cases include (but are not limited to) simple rate and threshold changes, and where there is significant forestalling risk. The government will consult on tax policy where it deems it necessary to do so. If a consultation is needed, it will be targeted, precise and only seek information that is genuinely needed.
 :There is no one size fits all approach for consultation. To deliver change quickly, the government will ensure that consultations last a proportionate amount of time to allow sufficient scrutiny of proposals without unduly delaying policy implementation. It will do so on a case-by-case basis, considering the complexity of the policy, any legal risks, the nature and capacity of interested parties invited to respond, and the need to ensure transparency and adequate scrutiny. The government will, in most cases, look to use standard timeframes for formal, written consultations on draft legislation.
-:In general, the government will also look to engage with external stakeholders to make sure that tax policy decisions are rooted in strong evidence and robust underlying research. This includes collaboration with the community of tax researchers and academics. HM Treasury and HMRC’s publication of their Areas of Research Interest for tax in November 2024 sets out questions that seek to understand the current economic landscape and anticipate future challenges and opportunities. The government is actively seeking to collaborate and work with the academic community to ground tax policy in the very latest research, making sure that it is well-informed, innovative and forward-looking.
+:In general, the government will also look to engage with external stakeholders to make sure that tax policy decisions are rooted in strong evidence and robust underlying research. This includes collaboration with the community of tax researchers and academics. ...
 :'''4.  Transparency'''
 :The government will ensure that tax policy making is open and transparent. It will continue to be clear on its rationale for tax changes and its assessment of the policy impacts.
-:The government will continue to publish tailored Tax Impact and Information Notes when it lays tax legislation. These notes provide external stakeholders with extensive details on policy objectives and impact assessment of tax measures. The government will continue to work closely with the Office for Budget Responsibility to publish certified policy costings at Budget.
+:The government will continue to publish tailored Tax Impact and Information Notes when it lays tax legislation. These notes provide external stakeholders with extensive details on policy objectives and impact assessment of tax measures. The government will continue to work closely with the Office for Budget Responsibility to publish certified policy costings at Budget ...
-:The government has heard stakeholder concerns that it is hard to track policy development through the policy making cycle. Where a formal consultation is necessary, the government will make the objectives and scope of the consultation clear in a way that allows interested parties to track policy development.
-:To facilitate this, the government will explore options for creating a dedicated resource that will provide latest information on all technical tax announcements, an overview of work to date, and links to any relevant publications.
-This document replaces the Tax Consultation Framework which was withdrawn on 1 October 2025 because 'it is out of date'.<ref> https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-consultation-framework</ref>
+This document replaces the Tax Consultation Framework which was withdrawn on 1 October 2025 because it was "out of date".<ref> ''https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-consultation-framework''</ref>
 In ''Martin, R (oao) v Chancellor of the Exchequer'' the applicant sought a declaration that the BPR reforms of the FA 2026 were enacted in breach of these principles (and so presumably void? but that was not pursued, perhaps wisely).  I would have thought that was simply unarguable.  But the Court listened respectfully (“excellent skeleton arguments”) before dismissing it:<ref> [2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin) at [64].</ref>

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 The UK has provided some form of Mobile-individual relief since 1914. Before 2025 the distinction between Mobile Individuals and Established Residents was determined by reference to domicile (supplemented by 7-year, 12-year and 15-year residence tests).  The Mobile-individual reliefs were the IT/CGT remittance basis and protected-trust reliefs (informally known as non-dom reliefs).
-After 2025, the distinctionbetween Mobile Individuals and Established Residents is determined by Qualifying New Resident status, in short, 10-year absence followed by no more than four years' residence, and the Mobile-individual relief is FIG relief.<ref> In this chapter I use the term “FIG relief” to include OWR.</ref>
+After 2025, the distinction between Mobile Individuals and Established Residents is determined by Qualifying New Resident status, in short, 10-year absence followed by no more than four years' residence, and the Mobile-individual relief is FIG relief.<ref> In this chapter I use the term “FIG relief” to include OWR.</ref>
 ==Tax competition==
@@ Line 238: / Line 238: @@
 :<i>https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w1679/w1679.pdf</i>
 Musgrave "Horizontal Equity Once More" National Tax Journal 43, no. 2 (1990) p.113-23
-:<i>	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/NTJ41788830?journalCode=ntj</i></ref> but their limitations are exposed when one tries to apply them in a real life context, such as an assessment of the fairness of the former remittance basis or FIG relief.  The concepts are not so much a definition of fairness as an approach to identifying the issues.  In deciding whether FIG relief is fair, one needs to ask if qualifying new residents and other UK residents relevantly equal.  The answer is not self-evident.
+:<i>	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/NTJ41788830?journalCode=ntj</i></ref> but their limitations are exposed when one tries to apply them in a real life context, such as an assessment of the fairness of the former remittance basis or FIG relief.  The concepts are not so much a definition of fairness as an approach to identifying the issues.  In deciding whether FIG relief is fair, one needs to ask if qualifying new residents and other UK residents are relevantly equal.  The answer is not self-evident.
 ==Assessment of reform: Metrics==
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 (2)	The “'''immigration response'''”: how many would choose not to come
-The Warwick Papers concluded, contrary to the generally- and long-accepted view, that the emigration and immigration responses would be small.  The Papers gives figures for the tax yield which would increase if the reliefs were abolished:
+The Warwick Papers concluded, contrary to the generally- and long-accepted view, that the emigration and immigration responses would be small.  The Papers give figures for the tax yield which would increase if the reliefs were abolished:
 :After accounting for this limited migration response, including the loss of existing tax paid by non-doms who leave, the additional tax that would be received is £3.23 billion. The net additional revenue to government, after also accounting for the loss of the remittance basis charge receipts, is £3.16 billion. Based on the upper bound for the expected migration effects, we can rule out increases in receipts of below £2.4 billion.
 :These findings allow us to rule out the concern – previously raised by Labour and Conservative politicians alike – that abolishing the non-dom regime would ‘cost Britain money’. ... Objections to restriction or removal of the remittance basis cannot therefore be based on their fiscal effects.
-I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE paper)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick papers:
+I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE paper)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick Papers:
 (1)	FIG relief: the Papers floated the possibility of a short term residence relief to replace the former remittance basis, but did not evaluate its cost<br/>
@@ Line 325: / Line 325: @@
 The cap on IHT payable by trusts, announced in the 2026 budget,<ref>See [[Excluded Property Exemptions#Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief | Cap on IHT charges: Transitional relief]]</ref>  is a recognition that the 2025 reforms went too far, and of concern about the numbers of non-doms who have left the UK or are planning to leave.  Of course those who have already left the UK are not likely to return.
-What proportion of IHT strictly due will be properly paid on the death of non-resident LTRs, or on settlements made by non-resident LTRs?
+What proportion of IHT strictly due will be properly paid on the death of non-resident LTRs, or on settlements made by non-resident LTRs? Discuss.
-−
 Discuss.
 ===Economic benefit: FIG relief===
@@ Line 430: / Line 428: @@
 Demos claims to be Britain's leading cross-party think-tank.</ref>
-Reinforcing the tendency not to consult is an HMRC culture which is hostile to the tax profession.  Chris Tailby, head of the HMRC Tax Avoidance Group 2004-2009 records:
+Reinforcing the tendency not to consult is an HMRC culture which is hostile to the tax profession.  Chris Tailby, head of HMRC Tax Avoidance Group 2004-2009, records:
 :... I was never happier than when a new tax avoidance initiative was greeted with howls of protest from the tax avoidance quarter.<ref>Tailby, "Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance" [2011] PCB 41.</ref>

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ''Users may [[contribute to the text]].  If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections.  A free subscription to the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits.  User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''
-For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf  Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]
+For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/5/5a/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%281%29.pdf  Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]
 ==Scope of chapter==

@@ Line 91: / Line 91: @@
 | colspan="2"  |  ''Income Tax''
 |-
-| Interest: Reliefs for non–residents  || [[Interest Income#Withholding tax: Exceptions | Withholding tax: Exceptions]]; [[Non-Resident Income Tax Relief#Non-residents IT relief: Introduction | Non-residents IT relief: Introduction]]
+|    Interest: Reliefs for non–residents  || [[Interest Income#Withholding tax: Exceptions | Withholding tax: Exceptions]]; [[Non-Resident Income Tax Relief#Non-residents IT relief: Introduction | Non-residents IT relief: Introduction]]
 |-
-| IME: Non-residents trading in investments || [[Investment Manager Exemptions#Investment manager exemptions | Investment manager exemptions]]
+|    IME: Non-residents trading in investments || [[Investment Manager Exemptions#Investment manager exemptions | Investment manager exemptions]]
 |-
 | colspan="2"  |  ''IHT''
 |-
-|UK funds: IHT relief for non LTRs || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled UK funds | Non-settled UK funds]]
+|    UK funds: IHT relief for non LTRs || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled UK funds | Non-settled UK funds]]
 |-
-| FOTRA securities: IHT relief for non-residents || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled FOTRA securities | Non-settled FOTRA securities]], [[Excluded Property: Definition#Income unpaid on life tenant death | Income unpaid on life tenant death]]
+|    FOTRA securities: IHT relief for non-residents || [[Excluded Property: Definition#Non-settled FOTRA securities | Non-settled FOTRA securities]], [[Excluded Property: Definition#Income unpaid on life tenant death | Income unpaid on life tenant death]]
 |}

@@ Line 285: / Line 285: @@
 This is not to say that the 2025 reforms are not defensible, on the basis of fairness or otherwise, just that little reasoned debate took place in public, and probably limited debate took place in private.
-===Clear and easy to operate
+===Clear and easy to operate===
 The 2025 rules are a success by these criteria.  They are unquestionably clearer than the pre-2025 rules. The test of residence is clearer than domicile.

@@ Line 134: / Line 134: @@
 Wales would also like to join in:
 :"If Northern Ireland is allowed to cut corporation tax, it would be outrageous if Welsh politicians did not have the option of doing the same"
+Gerald Holtham, chair of the Holtham Commission for Wales (Cited in the Scottish consultation paper).<br/>
-Gerald Holtham, chair of the Holtham Commission for Wales (Cited in the Scottish consultation paper).
-−
 So in the future there might be no shortage of corporation tax competition within the UK.</ref>
@@ Line 318: / Line 316: @@
 :These findings allow us to rule out the concern – previously raised by Labour and Conservative politicians alike – that abolishing the non-dom regime would ‘cost Britain money’. ... Objections to restriction or removal of the remittance basis cannot therefore be based on their fiscal effects.
-I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE papers)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick papers:
+I discussed the Warwick Papers in the [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/b/b8/2024_25_Edition.pdf 2024/25 edition] of this work<ref> Para 1.6 (Warwick/LSE paper)</ref>  and omit that now as it is of historic interest.  It is important to note that even if one accepts the authors' predictions - and there is room for doubt - they are not relevant to the reforms actually carried out in 2025, because these reforms differed in important ways from those contemplated in the Warwick papers:
 (1)	FIG relief: the Papers floated the possibility of a short term residence relief to replace the former remittance basis, but did not evaluate its cost<br/>

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:02, 31 July 2026
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−	''Users may [[contribute to the text]]. If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections. A ~~copy of~~ the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits. User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''	+	''Users may [[contribute to the text]]. If you see anything that needs correcting or expanding, please click on the edit link and make the corrections. A free subscription to the next edition of this work will be given to the user who makes the most edits. User contributions are reviewed by [https://www.taxchambers.com/team/rebecca-sheldon/ Rebecca Sheldon]''

	For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]		For this chapter in pdf format click here: [https://tfd.wiki.anarres.org/images/0/09/FD_1_Foreign_Domicile_Tax_Policy_%282%29.pdf Chapter 1 Mobile Individuals: Tax Policy]